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The Proposal
The events of the last part of 1982 (Mexico's near-
default) have confirmed earlier apprehensions con-
cerning the capacity of the international private
banking system to continue supporting the developing
countries' growing balance of payments deficits.
Ambassador Jayawardena has dwelt clearly on some
of the reasons for this dead-end: servicing costs have
increased as a result of higher interest rates, while the
capacity to reimburse has been impaired by declining
export earnings. Recent interventions by official
institutions are designed to ward off the worst, and to
save the main international banks from collapsing
under the accumulation of major defaults by
borrowing countries. But these are temporary
measures: unless economically profitable development
takes place in the borrowing countries, debts will not
be reimbursed.
Jayawardena's article emphasises the necessary
solidarity between the oil exporting countries, the
industrialised countries and the oil importing
developing countries. Much has been said to underline
this solidarity, but little has been done to transform it
into an active policy. Many schemes have been
advanced to try to induce surplus countries to commit
their reserves to longer term loans, thus overcoming
the present fragility of the recycling mechanism which
is based essentially on liquid assets. The developing
world needs to invest on a long term basis; short term
loans or even the middle term maturities of the euro-
market (7 to 8 years) will not satify their investment
requirements.
Ambassador Jayawardena recalls one scheme
advanced by the Commonwealth Secretariat, and
another known as the Gutowski/Roth plan. Both try
to set up some form of guarantee by the industrialised
countries, so that OPEC assets on loan to less
developed countries (ldcs) would be adjusted for
inflation or exchange risks, and would provide, in
return, a long term arrangement on the price of oil.
Such ambitious mechanisms are considered implau-
sible politically, and difficult to negotiate for lack of a
proper international forum broad enough to encom-
pass all the problems that would arise.
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Instead, another approach, more limited geograph-
ically at the European level, is suggested by
Jayawardena. It consists of:
- a unilateral offer by the EEC to introduce annually
a certain volume of inflation-indexed securities to
OPEC surplus subscribers, provided OPEC shows
restraint in the annual percentage increases of the
oil price. Part of the proceeds would be made
available to ldcs by specially created institutions;
- a reciprocal offer by surplus OPEC countries to
convert oil price increases into concessional loans
to oil importing developing countries. 'The
minimum volume of inflation-indexed securities
could always be equated to the concessional
financing burden so assumed by OPEC surplus
countries'.
Details of this scheme matter less than its spirit: it tries
to make interdependence work in practice by
providing each partner with an appropriate mix of
incentives. The maintenance of Third World pur-
chasing power and credit worthiness benefits both the
EEC and OPEC; OPEC derives a significant measure
of protection of its assets from the new instrument
offered by the EEC; restraint in the long term price
increases of oil is of value to the EEC and to the ldcs.
It is easy to find many drawbacks in such a plan; the
most obvious difficulty lies in trying to reach
intergovernmental agreements to put the system into
practice. But there are deeper objections.
How would the EEC countries manage the funds
received from OPEC in exchange for the guaranteed
securities? No institution could ever commit itself to
protect such securities against inflation and exchange
risks. Undoubtedly, the fact that OPEC would accept
longer term maturities than those of assets made
available to private banks would be a tremendous
advantage on present recycling practices. As a result
better management of the reinvested funds would be
possible. But there is no reason why such an
institution, by itself, would channel automatically the
funds collected into profitable portfolios of equity or
other assets in ldcs. Indeed, regardless of the liquidity
risk of the present recycling mechanism through
57
private banks, one may wonder what part of the
$500 bn or so of ide's debts has been used for sound
development investment, and what part has been used
merely for day to day consumption or in operations
with little prospect of ever producing a positive return.
Unless the interested partners devote more attention
to the investment needs and the return prospects of
such investments in ldcs, it is doubtful that enough
progress will be achieved towards a durable solution
to the present financial impasse.
Another weakness of Ambassador Jayardena's
suggestions is to leave the developing countries in a
passive role as mere recipients of loans, without
enough participation in decision-making, in particular
in the decision concerning the use of the reinvestible
funds received by the EEC institution against OPEC
assets.
Nevertheless, it would be regrettable to overlook
altogether this type of proposal. Since the governments
of the West have little choice but to come to the rescue
of their banks exposed in international lending to Ides
concerted initiatives should aim at correcting earlier
errors in the recycling mechanisms, and not at
perpetuating the established practices which are
largely responsible for the present crisis. One should
always keep in mind that euro-market conditions are
ill-suited to the long term development strategies of
ides; that the ratio of aid to commercial finance has
deteriorated beyond any reasonable figure; and that
the amount of direct equity investment in ldcs is a very
small percentage of all recycled funds, probably no
more than 5 per cent to 10 per cent.
One should face seriously the question of the shortfalls
in suitable instruments for development investment. It
has been noted that 'the largest part of OPEC surplus
funds is in bank deposits, short term financial
instruments, top rated corporate bonds, long term
government securities, government to government
loans and loans to international organisations. Only a
relatively small portion has reportedly gone into
equity investment in the industrial countries and
comparatively smaller to non-oil ide' Amuzegar
1982]. Given the deteriorating conditions of 1982,
there seem to be only two approaches to deal with the
present financial crisis.
On the one hand, there are global schemes, arranged
between governments and international organisations,
to provide the indebted ldcs with the necessary finance
to continue to service their debts. But unless schemes
attempt also to treat the financing of development
investments, the crisis itself will remain self
perpetuating.
On the other hand, one may advocate relying on
private direct investment to finance the agricultural
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and industrial needs of the ides. But past experience is
not very encouraging. The obstacles against increasing
direct investment by OPEC countries in the ides are
formidable: there are reservations by the recipient
countries as well as by the surplus countries;
institutional barriers and economic risks are con-
sidered higher in Ides; and OPEC countries may be
even more sensitive to such risks than industrial
countries, since their capital is not a forerunner to
exports of management, technology or equipment.
Nevertheless, such hurdles are not insurmountable.
Unlike the global financial schemes, direct investment
by a variety of international operators has the
advantage of relying on decentralised initiatives. The
conditionality of the IMF is no guarantee of
appropriate dynamism in the recipient country, while
direct investment is a good measure of the capacity of
developing countries to set up and manage a viable
development.
An Alternative
In a sense, Ambassador Jayawardena's proposal is an
attempt to bridge these two approaches. The spirit
which inspires it is a good recipe for new initiatives:
interdependence; a unilateral gesture by the EEC
during a period of 'soft oil market'; anticipation of a
reciprocal answer from the surplus countries. What is
suggested below is that this set of proposals could be
rearranged to answer the criticisms that have been
made both of global or regional schemes, and of direct
investment. In Jayawardena's scheme, one European
institution has the unenviable task of issuing inflation
proofed instruments to surplus countries, and of
reusing the collected funds in ides. Instead of
attempting such a one-sided guarantee of assets, the
institution could serve to promote the co-financing of
risk capital ventures between operators from OPEC,
from European countries and from ides. There would
be a sort of 'umbrella' or triangular management of
such co-financing, with a few simple rules of solidarity
between participants.
The basis of such action would be the setting up in Ides
of sectoral priority programmes, or strategies where the
potential for successful ventures appear large. Such
priority programmes should be discussed between the
participants, particularly in respect of the required
technological training and institutional continuity
necessary for their success. They should cover
agricultural self-sufficiency, energy diversification,
raw materials' contribution to development and
industrial development in relation to local needs or
international markets.' Instead of starting from the
Concerning industrialisation programmes, the discussion with EEC
Countries should attempt to promote joint development of new
industries in ldcs and modernisation of older industries in Europe
with a view to maximising the growth of potential markets in Idcs, in
Europe and elsewhere. Such joint investment would appear in many
instances capable of promoting complementary interests.
existing 'exportable' technologies of the industrial
countries (the export credit approach), such pro-
grammes would start from the investment needs of the
ldcs which are necessary for the success of a given
strategy. When programmes are agreed upon, public
and private investors would be invited to develop
ventures to meet their objectives. The rules of
solidarity would be known in advance: a political risk
guarantee; 'performance' norms from the foreign
investor; commitment by the 'host' government not to
change the economic and administrative rules agreed
upon when adopting the programme. It may also be
desirable in some cases for part of the risk capital in
such joint ventures to be covered by a 'commercial
guarantee': it might be called for, for example, in the
case of energy diversification programmes that may be
threatened in the short term by an unexpected fall in
international oil prices, while the long term return of
such diversification should not normally be affected.
A large part of the implementation of the ldcs'
strategies would thus be left to private decentralised
initiatives. Surplus country investors should be
reassured by several features of the scheme: the
association of risk-capital from developed and OPEC
countries; the fact that ldc governments would
themselves establish their objectives, so that there
should be no reason to be afraid of offending their
political sensitivity; the triangular formula, relating
individual equity venture to a larger overall solidarity
scheme. In practice, this 'umbrella' would thus
operate on a sectoral basis, inviting projects and
investors, and, following up the type of response it
obtains from the participating countries in respect of
the number of joint ventures, balance in the
geographical origin of the investments, 'performance'
etc. Should there be a lack of response from private
groups, the institution should then try to promote
implementation by itself raising supplementary funds
and taking a part of the commercial risks. This
triangular formula would be quite different from
suggestions made in 1977 to mix capital from OPEC,
technology from industrial countries and development
projects from ldcs; here, each participant's indirect
investment is on an equal footing.
One may observe that this type of public monitoring of
privately executed programmes is not entirely new. In
particular, a similar organisation was extensively used
in the United States during and after the war to
develop new technologies (nuclear, space). What
would be novel in this new proposal is its international
character as well as its application to Ide development
needs. The basis of this approach is to consider the ldcs
as equal participants, sharing in the conception, the
risks and benefits of a series of programmes aimed at
overcoming structural weaknesses in their economies.
They would not be left alone to meet the conditions
imposed by international financing institutions, but
could initiate themselves the programmes and
conditions which would make co-financing work in
practice. Indeed, no attempt should be made to force
on any country a particular framework for foreign
investment. But, within such an 'umbrella' one may
expect some of the mutual reservations (against
'profit' by foreign investors, against 'expropriation' by
host countries) to be lessened, and eventually to
disappear. Finally, the flexibility of such an initiative
should allow for a step by step development, from an
initial approach limited to one or two major
programmes having a momentum of their own
involving, for example, agriculture and energy. No
large negotiations would be necessary since initial
successes should attract, little by little, other
governments, from a limited initial group of the ACP
or other ldcs, OPEC, and the EEC.
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